Ambiguity and Deterrence

This book focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy during the period from 1945 to 1964.

Author: John Baylis

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 9780198280125

Category: History

Page: 495

View: 234

This book focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy during the period from 1945 to 1964. Based on recently released documents, the book argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.

Ambiguity and Deterrence

This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was ...

Author: John Baylis

Publisher:

ISBN: 9780191684357

Category: Deterrence (Strategy)

Page: 495

View: 196

This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

The Role of Ambiguity in Strategic Deterrence

The paper attempts to fill an existing substantive gap in the literature of strategic deterrence by presenting both theoretical analysis and a historical case study of ambiguity in deterrence threats.

Author: Ronald E. Blum

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category:

Page: 169

View: 134

The paper attempts to fill an existing substantive gap in the literature of strategic deterrence by presenting both theoretical analysis and a historical case study of ambiguity in deterrence threats.



A Theory of Strategic Ambiguity Credibility Transparency and Dual Deterrence

Author: Brett V. Benson

Publisher:

ISBN: 9780549041412

Category: International relations

Page: 195

View: 202

Intuition and international relations theory both affirm that commitments should be firm and transparent in order to be credible. Because ambiguity is believed to cut against the credibility of the commitment, it is commonly assumed that ambiguous commitments are inimical to cooperation and invite conflict. Why then do states often choose to make commitments that are deliberately ambiguous? The tension between the current state of international relations theory and empirical international politics presents a puzzle: anomalous ambiguous commitments occur despite prevailing theoretical predictions that they should undermine the credibility of the commitment by signaling weakness, creating incentives for opportunism, and, increasing the chances for misperception. My research uses formal theory, surveys, and cases studies to model and test three-party security agreements to demonstrate that the form of commitment is often a strategic choice, and, under certain conditions, ambiguous commitments can actually outperform firmer and more transparent alternatives. I demonstrate that under certain conditions deliberately ambiguous security commitments can work to deter challengers from destabilizing the status quo when transparently communicated alternatives would have the unintended consequence of bringing about the very outcome they are designed to prevent. In making this argument, my dissertation research makes three significant contributions to the study of international politics. First, it shifts our focus from credibility to variation in the type of commitment. Second, it challenges our intuition and scholarly presumption that information and transparency are strictly better by identifying some conditions under which actors are better off being ambiguous. Third, it distinguishes between various deterrence strategies for addressing dual deterrence dilemmas. In addition to the general contributions to the study of international politics, my research also adds to our understanding of the historical strategic interactions between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists and offers insights and policy implications regarding the ongoing security tensions between China and Taiwan.


Miscalculated Ambiguity

"This study analyzes how the new nuclear declaratory policy, espoused in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, balances the goals of deterrence and nonproliferation.

Author: David M. Franklin

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category: Deterrence (Strategy)

Page: 151

View: 826

"This study analyzes how the new nuclear declaratory policy, espoused in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, balances the goals of deterrence and nonproliferation. The author concludes that increasing complexity in the nuclear arena makes reliance on the legacy policy of "calculated ambiguity" both increasingly hazardous for deterrence and decreasingly effective as a nonproliferation tool. These detrimental outcomes demand innovation in strategic thinking and revision of nuclear declaratory policy, specifically through adoption of a sole-purpose nuclear policy. Employed in the assessment of the new policy is a multiple methodological approach using historical, theoretical and practical frameworks. This study undertakes an appraisal of historic deterrence policies and nonproliferation initiatives exposing the essential elements of each. Building off these assessments, a comparative analysis of the new policy, dubbed "Lead-but-Hedge", and a sole-purpose policy illuminates the strengths and shortfalls of each. Finally, the author examines the strategic consequences of the new policy on the nuclear decision-making of allies (Japan), competitors (India), and rivals (Iran). The inquiry finds that in an era of salient WMD threats, it is necessary to communicate more directly the risks and consequences associated with WMD use against the US and its interests. Adoption of a sole-purpose policy by the US best accomplishes this goal while balancing the requirements of deterrence, on the one hand, and the Obama administration's top priority of nonproliferation on the other."--Abstract.

Of Owl Or Ostrich

The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack.

Author: Mark A. Lakamp

Publisher:

ISBN:

Category: Biological arms control

Page: 70

View: 255

The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack. Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear weapons play in U.S. counterproliferation strategy. This thesis describes the policy of calculated ambiguity and offers some observations about its prospects and pitfalls. The thesis presents evidence that suggests nuclear weapons could play a positive role in the U.S. counterproliferation strategy, at least in some circumstances. It also explains how such a role could conflict with the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Such a role would also violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may damage the national interest.

Sharpening the Arsenal

But is there no conceivable operational contingency that justifies a first strike? Do we need a new nuclear policy for our new geopolitical reality? This book delves into the debate and charts out a way ahead.

Author: Gurmeet Kanwal

Publisher: HarperCollins

ISBN: 935277325X

Category: Technology & Engineering

Page: 272

View: 472

Speaking in Delhi in November 2016, Manohar Parrikar, India's then Defence Minister, said there should be an element of unpredictability in the country's military strategy. He wondered whether India's nuclear doctrine should be constrained by a 'no-first-use' posture. The essence of the defence minister's introspection was that ambiguity enhances deterrence. This view has been expressed by several nuclear strategists. Nuclear doctrines are not written in stone and are never absolutely rigid. They are not binding international treaties that must be adhered to in letter and spirit. Fifteen years have passed since India's nuclear doctrine was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in January 2003. A review of the nuclear doctrine is long overdue. Credible minimum deterrence and the posture of no-first-use have stood the test of time. But is there no conceivable operational contingency that justifies a first strike? Do we need a new nuclear policy for our new geopolitical reality? This book delves into the debate and charts out a way ahead.