Reactions to the Thucydides Trap * 4. Power Transition Theory before the Thucydides Trap * 5. What Does Thucydides Actually Say about the Origins of the War? * 6. In Search of Causality and Necessity: Aitiai and Prophasis * 7.
Author: U. S. Military
Two authoritative reports are included in this unique reproduction. The notion of a "Thucydides Trap" that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict--much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war "inevitable" between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE--has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino- American war. Allison's active promotion has given Thucydides (ca. 460-ca. 399 BCE), historian of the Peloponnesian War, new cachet as a sage of U.S.-China relations. References in academic journals, politicians' speeches, and political cartoons have become ubiquitous across the Indo- Pacific region. Allison examines this historical metaphor at length in his May 2017 book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? This case study examines the Thucydides Trap metaphor and the response it has elicited. Hewing closely to what the historian of the Peloponnesian War actually says about the causes and inevitability of war, it argues that, while Thucydides' text does not support Allison's normative assertion about the "inevitable" result of an encounter between "rising" and "ruling" powers, the History of the Peloponnesian War (hereafter, History) does identify elements of leadership and political dynamic that bear directly on whether a clash of interests between two states is resolved through peaceful means or escalates to war.Contents: 1. Introduction * 2. From the Aegean to the South (and East) China Sea * 3. Reactions to the Thucydides Trap * 4. Power Transition Theory before the Thucydides Trap * 5. What Does Thucydides Actually Say about the Origins of the War? * 6. In Search of Causality and Necessity: Aitiai and Prophasis * 7. Fear, Honor, and Interest, and Thucydides' other "Traps" * 8. Trap 1: National Character * 9. Trap 2: Governing System * 10. Trap 3: Domestic Tranquility * 11. Trap 4: Economic Power * 12. Trap 5: Leaders * 13. Trap 6: Allies and Alliances * 14. Trap 7: The Role of Tykē (Chance) in Peace and War * 15. Assessing the "Allison Trap" * 16. Conclusions: Destined for Difficult Diplomacy, Not for War * 17. Geography, History, DestinyThis compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Additional content: CRS Report, Human Rights in China - Thirty years after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Communist Party of China (CCP) remains firmly in power. People's Republic of China (PRC) leaders have maintained political control through a mix of repression and responsiveness to some public preferences, delivering economic prosperity to many citizens, co-opting the middle and educated classes, and stoking nationalism to bolster CCP legitimacy. The party is particularly wary of unsanctioned collective activity related to sensitive groups, such as religious and labor groups, ethnic minorities, political dissidents, and human rights activists. PRC authorities have implemented particularly harsh policies against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and followers of the Falun Gong spiritual exercise. Under the previous PRC leader, Hu Jintao (2002-2012), the CCP tolerated limited public criticism of state policies, relatively unfettered dissemination of news and exchange of opinion on social media on some topics, and some human rights advocacy around issues not seen as threatening to CCP control.