Realism and the Aim of Science

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper's Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery.

Author: Karl Raimund Popper

Publisher: Psychology Press

ISBN: 0415084008

Category: Philosophy

Page: 420

View: 294

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper's Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery. The Postscript is the culmination of Popper's work in the philosophy of physics and a new famous attack on subjectivist approaches to philosophy of science. Realism and the Aim of Science is the first volume of the Postcript. Popper here formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge: science aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, or justify, any theory to be true, not even if is a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticise all its theories, even those that happen to be true. Realism and the Aim of Science presents Popper's mature statement on scientific knowledge and offers important insights into his thinking on problems of method within science.

Realism and the Aim of Science

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper’s Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery.

Author: Karl Popper

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 1135858888

Category: Philosophy

Page: 464

View: 152

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper’s Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery. The Postscript is the culmination of Popper’s work in the philosophy of physics and a new famous attack on subjectivist approaches to philosophy of science. Realism and the Aim of Science is the first volume of the Postcript. Popper here formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge: science aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, or justify, any theory to be true, not even if is a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticise all its theories, even those that happen to be true. Realism and the Aim of Science presents Popper’s mature statement on scientific knowledge and offers important insights into his thinking on problems of method within science.

Realism and the Aim of Science

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper’s Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery.

Author: Karl Popper

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 1135858950

Category: Philosophy

Page: 464

View: 795

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper’s Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery. The Postscript is the culmination of Popper’s work in the philosophy of physics and a new famous attack on subjectivist approaches to philosophy of science. Realism and the Aim of Science is the first volume of the Postcript. Popper here formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge: science aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, or justify, any theory to be true, not even if is a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticise all its theories, even those that happen to be true. Realism and the Aim of Science presents Popper’s mature statement on scientific knowledge and offers important insights into his thinking on problems of method within science.





Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science

This volume brings together ten original, thematically-related papers, written by prominent figures in the philosophy of science in Australasia and elsewhere.

Author: S. Clarke

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9781402008313

Category: History

Page: 215

View: 985

This volume brings together ten original, thematically-related papers, written by prominent figures in the philosophy of science in Australasia and elsewhere. The contributed papers are focused on two fundamental issues in contemporary philosophy of science, the status of scientific realism and the relationship between science and commonsense. The contemporary scientific realism debate turns on the viability of the claims that science aims at truth and that we can justifiably believe that science has achieved or approximated this aim. Several papers in the collection constitute original contributions to this debate. Other papers explore what appears to be an increasingly divergent relationship between the scientific and commonsense images of the world. This volume is a valuable resource for all who are interested in and engaged by contemporary philosophy of science.

Scientific Realism

Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book.

Author: Stathis Psillos

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 1134619812

Category: Philosophy

Page: 368

View: 535

Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and to modern sceptical empiricism. Scientific Realism explains that the history of science does not undermine the arguments for scientific realism, but instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific realism as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice. Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the state of modern science and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book.

Modal Empiricism

This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism.

Author: Quentin Ruyant

Publisher: Springer

ISBN: 9783030723484

Category: Science

Page: 230

View: 234

This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science. This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science.

Scientific Realism

And here instrumentalism leaves us wholly in the lurch. 2. REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE The reason why Homo sapiens instituted the scientific enterprise ...

Author: N. Rescher

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9789027724427

Category: Philosophy

Page: 169

View: 562

The increasingly lively controversy over scientific realism has become one of the principal themes of recent philosophy. 1 In watching this controversy unfold in the rather technical way currently in vogue, it has seemed to me that it would be useful to view these contemporary disputes against the background of such older epistemological issues as fallibilism, scepticism, relativism, and the traditional realism/idealism debate. This, then, is the object of the present book, which will recon sider the newer concerns about scientific realism in the context of these older philosophical themes. Historically, realism concerns itself with the real existence of things that do not "meet the eye" - with suprasensible entities that lie beyond the reach of human perception. In medieval times, discussions about realism focused upon universals. Recognizing that there are physical objects such as cats and triangular objects and red tomatoes, the medievels debated whether such "abstract objects" as cathood and triangularity and redness also exist by way of having a reality indepen dent of the concretely real things that exhibit them. Three fundamen tally different positions were defended: (1) Nominalism. Abstracta have no independent existence as such: they only "exist" in and through the objects that exhibit them. Only particulars (individual substances) exist. Abstract "objects" are existents in name only, mere thought fictions by whose means we address concrete particular things. (2) Realism. Abstracta have an independent existence as such.

The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism

This book presents a major statement on the dominant philosophy of science by one of the world's leading metaphysicians.

Author: Brian Ellis

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 131749220X

Category: Philosophy

Page: 176

View: 399

This book presents a major statement on the dominant philosophy of science by one of the world's leading metaphysicians. Brian Ellis's new book develops the metaphysics of scientific realism to the point where it begins to take on the characteristics of a first philosophy. As most people understand it, scientific realism is not yet such a theory. It is not sufficiently general, and has no plausible applications in fields other than the well-established sciences. Nevertheless, Ellis demonstrates that the original arguments that led to scientific realism may be deployed more widely than they originally were to fill out a more complete picture of what there is. Ellis shows that realistic theories of quantum mechanics, time, causality and human freedom can all be developed satisfactorily, and moral theory can be recast to fit within this comprehensive metaphysical framework.

Scientific Realism

This, then, is the object of the present book, which will recon sider the newer concerns about scientific realism in the context of these older philosophical themes.

Author: N. Rescher

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9789027725288

Category: Philosophy

Page: 169

View: 812

The increasingly lively controversy over scientific realism has become one of the principal themes of recent philosophy. 1 In watching this controversy unfold in the rather technical way currently in vogue, it has seemed to me that it would be useful to view these contemporary disputes against the background of such older epistemological issues as fallibilism, scepticism, relativism, and the traditional realism/idealism debate. This, then, is the object of the present book, which will recon sider the newer concerns about scientific realism in the context of these older philosophical themes. Historically, realism concerns itself with the real existence of things that do not "meet the eye" - with suprasensible entities that lie beyond the reach of human perception. In medieval times, discussions about realism focused upon universals. Recognizing that there are physical objects such as cats and triangular objects and red tomatoes, the medievels debated whether such "abstract objects" as cathood and triangularity and redness also exist by way of having a reality indepen dent of the concretely real things that exhibit them. Three fundamen tally different positions were defended: (1) Nominalism. Abstracta have no independent existence as such: they only "exist" in and through the objects that exhibit them. Only particulars (individual substances) exist. Abstract "objects" are existents in name only, mere thought fictions by whose means we address concrete particular things. (2) Realism. Abstracta have an independent existence as such.

Critical Scientific Realism

This book comes to the rescue of scientific realism, showing that reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated.

Author: Ilkka Niiniluoto

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 9780199251612

Category: Philosophy

Page: 341

View: 266

This book comes to the rescue of scientific realism, showing that reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated. Philosophical realism holds that the aim of a particular discourse is to make true statements about its subject matter. Ilkka Niiniluoto surveys different kinds of realism in various areas of philosophy and then sets out his own critical realist philosophy of science.

Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science

This book articulates and defends that position.

Author: Howard Sankey

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 131705881X

Category: Philosophy

Page: 162

View: 474

Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains an original solution to the problem of induction that rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature.

The Instrument of Science

In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated and resilient than its predecessors. This position—‘cognitive instrumentalism’—involves three core theses.

Author: Darrell P. Rowbottom

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 0429663579

Category: Philosophy

Page: 216

View: 220

Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from serious defects. In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated and resilient than its predecessors. This position—‘cognitive instrumentalism’—involves three core theses. First, science makes theoretical progress primarily when it furnishes us with more predictive power or understanding concerning observable things. Second, scientific discourse concerning unobservable things should only be taken literally in so far as it involves observable properties or analogies with observable things. Third, scientific claims about unobservable things are probably neither approximately true nor liable to change in such a way as to increase in truthlikeness. There are examples from science throughout the book, and Rowbottom demonstrates at length how cognitive instrumentalism fits with the development of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century chemistry and physics, and especially atomic theory. Drawing upon this history, Rowbottom also argues that there is a kind of understanding, empirical understanding, which we can achieve without having true, or even approximately true, representations of unobservable things. In closing the book, he sets forth his view on how the distinction between the observable and unobservable may be drawn, and compares cognitive instrumentalism with key contemporary alternatives such as structural realism, constructive empiricism, and semirealism. Overall, this book offers a strong defence of instrumentalism that will be of interest to scholars and students working on the debate about realism in philosophy of science.

Internal Realism A Successful Response to Scepticism

Finally, I will summarize and evaluate the arguments in support of internal realism. The aim of this essay is to discover how successfully internal realism deals with scepticism.

Author:

Publisher: GRIN Verlag

ISBN: 3638347567

Category: Philosophy

Page: 11

View: 606

Essay from the year 2003 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: 73 (=1st), University of Nottingham (Department of Philosophy), course: Seminar, Realism and Anti-realism, 3 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: This essay is concerned with internal realism, a position that can be understood as intermediate between scientific realism and constructivism, which are two strands in the realism/ anti-realism debate regarding philosophy of science. It is presented in the paper “What Science Aims to Do” by Brian Ellis (1985). To introduce the problem Ellis faces in his essay, I shall begin by outlining the debate on the aim of science, presenting a sceptical argument which claims that truth is irrelevant to scientific discoveries. I will then go on to outline and discuss three central points concerning Ellis’ paper: Scientific Realism; Conventionalism and Empirical Underdetermination; and Internal and Metaphysical Realism. Finally, I will summarize and evaluate the arguments in support of internal realism. The aim of this essay is to discover how successfully internal realism deals with scepticism.

Relativism and Realism in Science

Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encour aged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question.

Author: R. Nola

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9400928777

Category: Science

Page: 301

View: 437

The institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour began comparatively earl- though not always under that name - in the Australasian region. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appoint ments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and 1960s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of Wollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia and in New Zealand. "Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science" aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. Papers address general issues, however, rather than local ones; parochial topics are avoided. Further more, though in each volume a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand, contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out. Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encour aged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question.


The Scientific Image

Presenting an empiricist alternative to both logical positivism and scientific realism, this book insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance.

Author: Bas C. Van Fraassen

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 0198244274

Category: Science

Page: 235

View: 747

The aim of The Scientific Image is to develop an empiricist alternative to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against positivism, the author insists on a literal interpretation of the language of science, and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against realism he argues that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy, and that the only belief involved in the acceptance of a scientific theory is belief that the theory fits the observable phenomena. To substatiate this, the book presents three mutually supporting theories concerning science. The first is an account of the relation between a scientific theory and the empirical world. The second is a new theory of explanation and why-questions, according to which the explanatory power of a theory is a pragmatic aspect which goes beyond its empirical import, but which provides no additional reasons for believing it. And the third is an interpretation of probability in physical theory, with reference to both classical and quantum physics. The presentation of these three central theses is preceded by two chapters which provide an informal introduction to current debates in the philosophy of science, particularly concerning scientific realism.